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1
INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship between religion, the law and the human rights of women in the
Middle East and North Africa region?
Compared to other regions in the world, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
region has been a clear outlier where gender issues are concerned. 1 Based on year 2002 data
compiled from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset the MENA region
shows the lowest scores in the world on the combined values of political and economic rights of
women. 2 In the same token, the MENA region scores highest among world regions on the
Religion and the State (RAS) measures, which quantify the extent of state involvement in
religion in 175 countries, making the MENA region’s women’s human rights and secularity
levels equally lowest in the world.
As a puzzle to a myriad of scholars in a number of fields, the region is associated with a
great many factors affecting its performance on respect for the human rights of women. The
conundrum that this study will explore is the correlation between religion in state law and the
human rights of women (defined here in terms of political and economic rights), to understand
why it is that the status of women is so much lower in the MENA than in any other region in the
world. Hence, the following multivariate analysis examines a number of social and legal
explanations (particularly religious and legal institutions) on the domestic state level of analysis,
as a means of uncovering their effect on the political and economic rights of women within
states.

1

Sub-Saharan Africa is another outlier in terms of gender equality and the status of women in most areas of society.
An important difference to note among the MENA and Sub-Saharan African regions, however, is that the rate of
female participation in both the political and economic realms in Sub-Saharan Africa remains higher than those in
the MENA. For more on these differences, see CIRI scores; and World Bank c2004, especially statistics and figures
on pp. 59, 61, 65, 99, 102, and 139.
2
See Appendix A for more on definition and measurement criteria of the political economic (and social) rights of
women as indicated by CIRI.
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Figure 1. CIRI Combined Political and Economic Rights of Women by Region

Figure 1 is compiled using CIRI results. The combined score is scaled from 0 to 6, as the
categories of a) political and b) economic scores are each scaled by CIRI from 0 to 3. Women's
political rights are measured in terms of their de jure as well as de facto protection in each
country, and are based on internationally recognized rights consisting of the following five
criteria:
-

The right to vote;
The right to run for political office;
The right to hold elected and appointed government positions;
The right to join political parties; and
The right to petition government officials.
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Women’s economic rights are measured in the same manner consisting of the following ten
criteria:
-

Equal pay for equal work;
Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male
relative's consent;
The right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's
consent;
Equality in hiring and promotion practices;
Job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs,
etc...);
Non-discrimination by employers;
The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace;
The right to work at night;
The right to work in occupations classified as dangerous;
The right to work in the military and the police force.
According to CIRI, scores of 0 to 3 for each category consist of the following

measurement criteria ranging from no rights enshrined in the law to full protection in practice:
-

A score of 0 indicates that women's rights [are] not guaranteed by law;

-

A score of 1 indicates that women's rights [are] guaranteed in law, but severely prohibited
in practice;

-

A score of 2 indicates that women's rights [are] guaranteed in law, but [are] still
moderately prohibited in practice; and

-

A score of 3 indicates that women's rights [are] guaranteed in both law and practice.
To make one single Women’s Political and Economic Rights (WPER) variable for this

study, the two variables (women’s political and women’s economic rights) are combined to
range from 0 to 6, with 0 indicating no protection under the law for both women’s political and
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economic rights, and 6 indicating full protection under the law and in practice for both women’s
political and economic rights. 3
Regional divisions in Figure 1 are organized in their ascending order from lowest (2.1 out
of 6) to highest (4.5 out of 6) WPER scores: 1) The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 2)
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 3) Asia, 4) Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 5) Oceania
(OCEA), 6) Europe (EUR), and 7) North America (N.AM). The Countries included in each
regional category are listed in Appendix B. The majority of the world, compiled for this
particular study, consists of 136 countries in 2002, including the MENA region, and scores an
average of 3.5 out of 6 on WPER.

The first chapter of this paper examines previous research by various social scientists
addressing the intermingling issues of women’s human rights, religion and the law in the MENA.
The second chapter outlines potential research questions to be addressed by the study, while the
third chapter presents a set of hypotheses to be tested by the regression analysis. The detailed
methodology used to test these hypotheses is outlined in chapter four, which includes a list of
variables and their attributes, as well as the path used to explore their relationships. Finally, the
fifth chapter reports and analyzes the findings, while offering suggestions for future research.

3

For more on definitions, criteria and measurement methods, refer to Cingranelli-Richards Data Project, available at
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/. Also, refer to Appendix A below for more detail on WPER.
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CHAPTER 1.
LITERATURE REVIEW: WHAT WE KNOW, WHAT WE SEEK TO UNDERSTAND
Gender related human rights advancement is initiated through various venues, some are
at the grassroots levels of society; others are imposed from above. Some scholars have identified
political and social revolutions as catalysts both for women’s empowerment and for their
oppression (Goldstone; Moghadam; Tucker; Tetreault; Chinchilla; Farhi; and Moaddel);
economic development and access to resources, the first as a means of both ameliorating and
worsening, the second as a means of improving, the status and economic independence of
women in the MENA (Doumato; Beck and Nashat; Tohidi; World Bank). Others have pointed
the finger at colonialism and imperial domination as a double-edged sword. Along with the
positive effects of modernization that western influence introduced, modern development often
only benefited society’s elite classes, while breeding anti-imperialist resentment among
indigenous societies, which became defensive of their traditional values, including those values
defining women’s social, economic and political roles (Philippa; Chandra; Monshipouri). Other
factors discussed in recent literature are globalization and Universalist interpretations of the
human rights of women (Huntington; Hatem; Kelly, Bayes, Hawkesworth and Young;
Gordenker and Weiss). The first having negative effects similar to those of the previous wave of
modernization, as globalization often tends to breed economic, social and/or political
development, while also inducing economic and other inequalities, like urban-rural social
divides, which sometimes act to further the exploitation of women in developing countries.
Universalist interpretations of the human rights of women are often described as an
amalgamation of western concepts imposed on the rest of the global community, many members
of which prefer to define human rights relative to their culture. This also can have negative

6
backlashes on the status of women, as with the above-mentioned anti-imperialist retaliation,
where traditions are preserved, or promoted more coercively or deliberately as a means of
defending one’s culture from external cultural influence or domination.
Others have associated patriarchy with religion, as an inherently traditional tool for
gender inequality, as many religious texts specify differing gender roles, explicitly or implicitly
defining gender roles in ways that may be contradictory to most contemporary social definitions
of such roles, or that may directly subjugate women to moral oppression (Nassar; Hegland;
Okkenhaug and Flaskerud; Razavi; Moghissi), while various other feminist thinkers have pointed
specifically to patriarchal interpretations of Islam, as opposed to the religious texts themselves,
as catalysts for the human rights gap for women in the MENA, in order to preserve or promote a
gentler version of Islam regarding gender relations and the status of women (Lerner; Ahmed;
Anwar; Doumato; Ebadi and Moaveni; Monshipouri). Some of these Islamic feminist scholars
point to the original texts of the Koran to highlight powerful female figures mentioned in the
Koran, who were revered for their leadership, despite the polygamous tradition enshrined in the
religion (Lerner; Ahmed). They also point to the patriarchal values explicitly present in
Christian, Judaic, Hindu and Buddhist texts, among others, to illustrate the importance of
interpretation, since many states with some of these religious majorities managed to ease (or
modernize) the traditional interpretations of gender roles to develop less patriarchal societies.
On the issue of religion, theocracy has been directly associated with patriarchy. Women’s
human rights as a function of theocracy have been examined by a number of scholars interested
in the effect of Islamic fundamentalism on the status of women in Post-Revolutionary Iran,
which has become increasingly patriarchal since the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1970s
(Erzeel; Kunkler; Moghissi; Moghadam). Others have pointed to theocratic regime in
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Afghanistan under the Taliban as a cause for the demise of women’s rights in that country
(Moghadam), as well as Bhutan’s Buddhist monarchy, that lasted from the 17th to the 20th
century, as a cause for women’s inferior status during these centuries, despite the country’s
matrilineal culture (Pain and Pema). Some scholars have tapped into the effect of theocratic
values in America on gender relations in marriage and the market (Kintz), and on the civil rights
movement (Sawyer). On the other side of the debate, some scholars have argued that theocracy,
namely that of an Islamic model, actually enhances non-Muslim minority rights (although this is
does not address women) (Berween), and is the ideal state model for Islamic societies (Ates);
while their intellectual adversaries predict theocracy’s demise to come about in great part due to
its poor performance on human rights protection (Amuzegar; Boroumand and Boroumand).
Despite the multi-sided debates on gender issues in the MENA, the reality on the ground
points to the fact that, in addition to strong theocratic values, even in the most developed
countries across the region, they seem to remain trapped under and misrepresented in one
particular domain—the law, both written and practiced. More specifically, women are least
represented by family law, which includes the areas of marriage, divorce, custody, and
nationality through marriage (Hosseini; Mokbel-Wensley; Hamadeh; Connors; Howland;
Buergenthal; Hawley; Raday; Foblets; and Yamani).
Women’s access to policy making and their participation in the economies of relatively
‘modernized’ cultures within the MENA, such as those in Israel and Turkey, and to a lesser
extent Morocco, Tunisia, and Syria, seems to surpass that of their regional ‘traditional’
neighbors, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and other Gulf states. In the same token, we find
that the legal representation of women (in family law especially) is also repressive at varying
degrees across the region.
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Figure 2. Political and Economic Rights of Women across the MENA

Compared to any other world regions, the MENA scores highest on all Religion and the
State measures (RAS): very high on Government Involvement in Religion (GIR) and very low
on the “practically non-existent” Separation of Religion and the State (SRAS) measures. 4 In
practically every MENA country, with the exception of Turkey, religious legislation governs
marriage laws, and non-religious marriage is banned. In most Islamic majority MENA countries,
like Iran, Tunisia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and others, Islam is constitutionally the
state religion, and Sharia governs marriage laws, while religious minorities are governed by
special religious courts. In religiously pluralistic Lebanon, the constitution of which is based on
religious cooperation in a consociational political system, family law, especially marriage, is
governed by one’s designated religious court. Again, family matters are governed solely by

4

See Jonathan Fox, p. 218, and entire Chapter 8 esp. Tables 8.1 to 8.4. J. Fox’s dataset was recently released (2008)
with dozens of measures quantifying the relationship between religion and state in over 170 countries. This data is
instrumental for the present study.
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one’s designated religion, and no choice exists for secular and/or interfaith marriage. For women,
this is often detrimental to their personal status, as in most religious laws, traditional patriarchal
gender roles often apply. The Catholic Maronite Church restricts divorce, Sharia law demands a
wife’s obedience to her husband, and honor killings remain legal, despite the country’s
reputation of modernity and cultural openness. Israel, which is often associated with western
ideals, harbors one official state religion, Judaism, with special religious courts governing
religious minorities. All marriage must adhere to one religious court or another; and interfaith
marriage is prohibited. In Saudi Arabia, an officially Islamic monarchy, religious adherence is
mandatory; atheism and apostasy are both punishable by death, and traditional Islam is more
fundamentally conserved than in any other country in the world by the highly orthodox wahabi
faith. 5
On the role of the Law, a number of qualitatively analytical scholars have pointed to the
archaic nature of the legal apparatus in many MENA states, arguing that the static notions, which
remain enshrined in unreformed legislation, are a major factor keeping the status of women from
rising beyond its traditional levels (Hosseini; Mokbel-Wensley; Hamadeh; Connors; and
Yamani). Other historical analysts have addressed religious fundamentalism enshrined in the law
as a major obstacle to the amelioration of women’s status in the region (Howland, Buergenthal,
Hawley, Raday, Foblets); while Raday and Howland have looked specifically at religious
pluralism in the legal systems, where separate courts for different religious groups have
jurisdiction over some matters, most often family and personal laws, as a notable obstruction to
the human rights of women in the MENA. Jewish, Muslim and Christian women alike in Israel
5

Wahabism is an orthodox interpretation of Islam introduced in 1750 by Muhammad ibn abd al Wahab, the Islamic
reformer and co-founder of the political entity known today as Saudi Arabia. In many ways, wahabism is considered
a reactionary belief system as it looked to the past, namely to the early generations of Islam, before the prophet’s
teachings were repeatedly reinterpreted by numerous caliphs in the centuries following the prophet’s death. The
faith is based on tawhid or Unitarianism, and is most characteristic of puritanical Islamic teachings.

10
are notably disadvantaged by religious jurisdictions over their personal affairs. Although divorce
is not prohibited in the Jewish community, it is made very difficult with a strong bias towards the
husband. A Jewish woman seeking divorce is prohibited from remarrying, and a child born out
of wedlock is considered illegitimate and is labeled “mamzer”, a term meaning “bastard”. 6
Family law for Christian women in Israel is governed by different courts for the 13 recognized
denominations in that country, and while divorce is not illegal for them, it is also made difficult,
while in marriage, the traditional duty of obedience to the husband is implemented. 7 For the
Islamic community, although honor killings and polygamy are legally prohibited, they are
largely ignored by the state, while custody and remarriage laws are strongly biased against
women. In addition, while marital rape is criminalized by the state, the law can be overruled by
an Islamic court for Muslim couples under Sharia law. 8 Hence, the Israeli example, which also
compares to the Lebanese, offers a strong indicator that religious legal pluralism, with increased
autonomy to religious jurisdiction, gravely increases misogyny.
Table 1 demonstrates the excessive entanglement of religion in state and court law across
the MENA region and figure 3 shows the clearly inverse relationship between women’s political
and economic rights and the extent of religious legal restrictions. With the exception of Turkey,
every Middle Eastern country prohibits interfaith marriage. Out of the 21 countries shown here,
only five do not espouse religious courts. In Algeria and Libya, state family law (Frenchinfluenced in the first, and French-Italian-influenced in the latter) is based on Shari’ a, and
applies to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 9 In Kuwait and Morocco, by contrast, Shari’a state

6

Raday, p. 160.
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
See Reunite International, a UK based Non Governmental Organization specializing in family law and the rights of
children worldwide. For summary texts on various states beginning with Algeria, see:
http://www.reunite.org/pages/algeria.asp, accessed April 2009.
7

11
law only applies to Muslims, while non-Muslims principles apply to other religions according to
their following.

Table 1. Religious Legal Restrictions across the MENA 10

Country
MENA Region
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan*
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
UAE
Yemen

Restrictions
on Interfaith
Marriages

Presence of
Religious
Courts

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Personal
Status
Defined by
Clergy

Inheritance
Defined by
Religion
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Percent of
Muslim
Population
90
98
99
98
94
99
97
15
92
85
56
98
99
87
96
95
97
90
98
100
96
99

Restriction on interfaith marriage appears to be a special trait of the region. Only six
countries outside the MENA prohibit inter-religious unions: in Africa, Djibouti and Sudan; in
Asia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, and Maldives. All but India are Muslim majority states. On the
other hand, 14 non-MENA countries espouse religious courts: seven in Africa (Djibouti, Kenya,
10

Jonathan Fox’s Religion and the State project for the year 2002.
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Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan, six in Asia (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Maldives, Philippines, and Singapore), and one in Europe (Malta). Most of these states are
demographically religious pluralities, where religious courts exist to accommodate minorities.

Relationship Between Religious Legal
Restrictions in Family Law and WPER in the
MENA
5
4
3
2
1
0

Religious Legal Restrictions

WPER

Figure 3. The Relationship between the Number of Religious Legal Restrictions in
Family Law (see table 1) and Women’s Political and Economic Rights across the
MENA

Despite commendable endeavors by political scientists like Fearon and Laitin, as well as
Norris and Inglehart, among others, to further large sample studies on religious ideology and the
state, as well as important resources from the World Bank to quantify the development of women
in the MENA, few regression analyses have been done to explore and address the potential
effects of (religious) legal pluralism on women’s human rights in the region. This is an area of
the literature that remains a challenge and is still in the beginning stages of development. As
defined by Yüksel Sezgin, legal pluralism is seen as “the instances of non-state normative
orderings [under which category including religious courts], incorporated within a so-called
‘unified’ central administration under the auspices of the state”, hence these normative orderings

13
enjoy some degree of autonomy within an overarching state apparatus in governing or
adjudicating particular matters of society that pertain to their normative order. 11 Although
Sezgin, invokes the case of Israel’s pluralistic legal system to demonstrate the detrimental effects
of religious legal pluralism on the rights of individuals, including women, his elaborate historical
analysis of Israel calls for a more encompassing large sample analysis of religious legal
pluralism and its effects on human rights. While he offers some quantitative analytical
suggestions to the study of pluralistic legal systems, no large sample statistical analyses have
examined the effects of religious legal pluralism on women’s human rights.
Indeed, while political scientists recognize “the law” as an integral part of a viable
political system, they often overlook its complexities and its potential effects as a significant
variable (Sezgin). When discussing the concept of state, society and human rights, the legal
apparatus becomes an increasingly important factor, since “courts are increasingly given the
powers to constrain, shape and dismantle government action and acts” (Cichowski). In other
words, it is through the court system that human rights can be enforced, claimed and protected;
or they can be undermined, ignored, and abused. The courts may be where a democracy can
progress to become more responsive; or digress to become more repressive.
Different types of legal systems may potentially yield undiscovered insight on how legal
code correlates to the human rights of women in a given country or region based on the power
allocation between the state and various courts. As discussed with Sezgin, studying legal systems
per pluralism poses particular challenges as many systems are complex combinations of different
codes, and levels and degrees of state-court jurisdiction powers are particularly challenging to
quantify. Hence, for this particular analysis, to probe the preliminary quantification of legal
religious plurality, a number of available indicators will be examined to assess the relationship
11

Sezgin 2004, p. 103.
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between religion, the law and the economic and political rights of women in the MENA. More
specifically, the study will focus on the law in personal and family matters, such as marriage,
divorce, and inheritance (Hosseini; Mokbel-Wensley; Hamadeh; Connors; Yamani; Howland;
Buergenthal, Hawley, Raday, Foblets; Sezgin). For instance, is family law governed by national
secular courts (applicable and accessible to every individual regardless of class, race, gender,
religion, etc.) or is it under the jurisdiction of religious or customary courts, over which the
national government has little or no authority? Is interfaith marriage, an indicator of religious
exclusion and legal plurality, allowed or prohibited, and how does this affect women’s EPR? If
the government is a theocracy, then how does the large degree of state religion (naturally
embedded into the court system, and into family and personal laws) affect the human rights of
women in that state? In addition, how does the presence of religious courts, another indicator of
some degree of religious legal plurality, as courts have different degrees of autonomy in different
states, play into WEPR?

Why Examine Family Law? Why Legal Pluralism?
In the larger area of the literature on women’s human rights, namely in the Middle East,
where religion plays a strong role in politics and in the law, family law has been identified
consistently as an area of policy affecting the status of women in the region. Drastic changes in
Iran’s family law provisions during the transitions from a secular legal code under the reign of
Mohamed Reza Shah to the strict religious code installed by the Khomeini regime have posed a
constant challenge to women’s human rights activists in the country since the Khomeini
Revolution in 1979. In a different instance, the legal pluralistic system of Israel, where 14
different types of religious courts (one court for each religious sect existing in the country)
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control family and personal matters according to their beliefs, has created obstacles for women in
the domestic and personal realms, as the system allows for a less involved role for the state in
defining and defending human rights on a personal or family basis. Similarly, in neighboring
Lebanon, 18 religious sects attempt to peacefully coexist under a pluralistic legal system where
the state offers autonomous jurisdiction to each court over its designated followers (those
belonging to the religious sect of the court), creating various obstacles to women in family
related matters, such as areas of inter-religious marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance,
among others.
When family law is excluded from the responsibilities of the state, and placed into the
hands of religious courts, how does this affect the individual rights of women? When religious
institutions are the primary decision makers in the areas of personal legal matters, how much is
the state exercising its duties as a protector of its citizens’ rights? Is the state, in such an instance
respecting its citizen’s negative rights (which require governments to refrain from acting as a
means of respecting citizen rights) at the expense of their positive rights (where government is
obliged to take action as a means of defending citizen rights)? In the same token, while this legal
plurality presumably may allow for less friction among differing sects or lower costs for the state
apparatus (by minimizing state responsibility for court management), does it not result in the
protection of cultural and religious rights at the expense of individual rights, hence directly
obstructing the voices of many individuals, especially social and political minorities, such as
women?
As discussed thus far, we do know that a number of factors have been identified as
potential causes for the different levels of freedom that women experience in various countries,
however, we are not certain as to which factor or factors is or are most significant when a myriad
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of variables, in a large sample of countries, are considered. Judging from the most prominent
scholarly work on the issue of women’s human rights in the MENA region, we have seen that the
issues of law, religious fundamentalism, economics, culture, and colonial history have been
prominent topics in the literature. The following study will take into consideration a number of
variables with a strong focus on testing religious laws governing family matters, and religious
legal plurality. This test consists of a large sample regression analysis of multiple variables
potentially affecting the different rights of women in 136 countries across the globe, with the
anticipation of generating relevant and parsimonious findings and probing further research in an
otherwise neglected area of comparative politics.
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CHAPTER 2.
POTENTIAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Do more religious governments tend to be more patriarchal? Does a religiously
pluralistic legal code yield a more misogynistic society in terms of women’s place in the
economic and political spheres? In other words, are secular legal systems less patriarchal than
religion-based legal systems? If so is the legal system simply reflective of a country’s cultural
and religious patriarchal values, or could it be playing a role in solidifying, and/or abusing those
values?

Figure 4. State-Society Interactions through Law Influencing Women’s Access to Power

When state interaction with religion is so intimate, does this indirectly block women’s
access to policy making and to the economy? When the state offers negative rights (freedom of
jurisdiction) to a religious court/s at the expense of positive rights (protection of the law) to
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women in the social realm (domestic and personal matters), how does this affect women in the
political and economic realms? Could too much religious authority over family matters cause too
much social repression of women, which in turn causes their increased political alienation and
economic dependence?
As demonstrated in figure 4, by exercising their negative rights (guaranteed by the state),
religious groups in a religiously pluralistic legal system have open access to the law through
religious courts, where they may institutionalize traditional values and norms. These values and
norms are often contrary to gender equality within the social or domestic sphere that governs
marriage, divorce, custody and other family matters. With the state offering no secular resort for
women in these realms, women’s most dominant avenue to the law, and to participation in the
state apparatus, often becomes dependent upon their association with or adherence to religious
values, which govern socially-accepted and legally enshrined norms. If a conflict exists between
women’s personal interests and religious legislation, the latter wins the political battle (since the
state has guaranteed negative rights to religious groups in legal matters), which then results in
women’s limited access to power. As a woman’s access to the law diminishes with this conflict
of interest with religious law, how much does this affects her access to policy making, since the
state deems religious and cultural rights above her individual rights? In the same token, with a
social conflict of interest between her and religious laws, what becomes of her opportunities in
the workforce? What becomes of her economic right to work without her husband or guardian’s
consent, her practical access to irregular work shifts, her control over salary earned, her stakes in
earning fair pay, and so on? If a woman is interested in running for office, yet her husband or
guardian refuses to allow this under a given religious decree, or when a woman is coerced to vote
based on religious and social norms, how much policy can she really influence in her own
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country? When she is prohibited to pass her own nationality to a husband who is a foreigner or
an outsider to her native religion, how does this affect her family’s access to the workforce, to
legal protection, and to government policy making? How does this affect her political and
economic status?
In short, when family law is governed by various religious codes, and excludes all secular
options, does this create religious authority as opposed to religious freedom in the area most
important to women in MENA societies? While Religious freedom offers the liberty to choose
between religious or secular legal means to settle personal matters, religious authority
concentrates political power in the hands of religious leaders in personal legal matters, often
coercing individuals in a group to adhere to religious law and only religious law, hence
suppressing their individual voices within communities. If this is what we find in MENA
societies, then what other options might exist to strike what may be a very delicate balance
between cultural and religious rights on one hand, and individual rights on the other hand?
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CHAPTER 3.
HYPOTHESES
This study will test two main hypotheses. The first examines the relationship between
family law and women’s PER, and the second assesses the correlation between religious legal
plurality and women’s PER.
H1: As religious regulation of family law increases in a given state, women’s political
and economic rights decrease.
↑ Religious Regulation of Family Law (RFL) 12  ↓ Women’s PER
H2: As religious legal pluralism increases, by the presence of religious courts and the
prohibition of interfaith marriages, women’s political and economic rights decrease.
↑Religious Legal Pluralism (RLP)13  ↓ Protection of Women’s PER
Therefore, if a state engenders a legal code of state religion governing family law and/or a
religious pluralistic legal code, then we should expect that state to demonstrate decreased
protection for the political and economic rights of women.
Indeed both religious regulation of family law and legal pluralism are derived from
cultural bases. Social and religious history often drives legal traditions to evolve. As legal
scholars have pointed, gender issues are often primarily dictated by culture (i.e.: traditions,
customs, norms, social identifications, etc.), which in turn dictates legal system characteristics
(Glenn). Certainly, there is no legal system that does not stem from moral and philosophical
teachings, most of which are derived from religious texts. This is true of Eastern traditional
cultures of South Asia, Islamic cultures of the MENA, as well as Christian societies of North and
Latin America and Europe, among others (Peach; Feldman; Berman). All these legal systems

12
13

Family law is defined as personal status law (marriage, divorce, and/or burial) and/or inheritance law.
RLP is defined as a) the presence of religious courts, and/or b) restriction on interfaith marriages.
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derive from religious moral discourse. The prominence of anti polygamy and polyandry, as well
as anti-abortion and sodomy laws in most western states is more relate to Christian morals than
to what we may call “secular” beliefs. Hence, this study is certainly not based on the assumption
that “secular” versus “non-secular” legal system are easily distinguishable, as, indeed they are
not. However, while many western democracies remain imperfect when assessing their women’s
human rights protection scores, comparative regional analysis demonstrates a stark difference in
the degrees of separation between state and religion. Jonathan Fox’s A World Survey of Religion
and the State takes many realities into consideration, as is discussed below. In the data, we do
indeed find that different societies have implemented different degrees of religiosity in the state
system, which in turn affects the religiosity of legal systems.
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CHAPTER 4.
METHODOLOGY
To test the above hypotheses, and answer the series of research questions, this study will
consist of a large sample quantitative analysis of the international state system. This crossnational study will include 136 countries, observing the year 2002, as it is the latest year and the
most complete RAS dataset on the relationship between religion and the state. The statistical
analysis will present a multivariate ordered logistic regression, consisting of 14 independent
variables and one dependent variable, which will include the following. Two main independent
variables (Family Law and Religious Legal Pluralism); twelve control variables (State Official
Religion, State Legal Discrimination against One or More Religions, British/French Colonialism,
Ottoman Rule, Gender Ratio Enrollment in Tertiary Education, GDP per Capita, Demographic
Islamic Presence, Demographic Non-Religious Adherents, Oil per capita production, and
Regime Type); and one dependent variable (combined women’s political and economic rights, or
WPER). This chapter outlines the corresponding details.

Independent Variables
MAIN X’S

Family Law: This is a variable constructed by combining two RAS variables with a
statistically reliable Cronbach’s Alpha of .79. Personal status law and inheritance law, which
both measure common indicators of family law, are in binary codes (0/1). Personal status law is
defined as “marriage, divorce, and/or burial, where 0 indicates that personal status is not defined
by the clergy and 1 indicates that it is. With respect to Inheritance law, 0 indicates that
inheritance is not defined by religion; 1 indicates that it is. When combined, they are ordinally
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coded from 0-2, 0 indicating total secularity in family law, and 2 indicating stronger religious
jurisdiction.
It is important to mention here that while this indicator is useful, it poses the
disadvantage of poor definition, especially in the first sub-indicator, personal status. The fact that
personal status is defined as “marriage, divorce, and/or burial” does not capture the entire story
for women’s issues, as this definition may include any one, two or three of marriage, divorce, or
burial, hence, while it is used as a first step in this study to capture some form of quantification
for family law, a more precise indicator is needed for future studies, where it can be tested more
accurately. 14
Religious Legal Pluralism: This is also a variable constructed by combining two RAS
variables, with a statistically reliable Cronbach’s Alpha of .92— Restrictions on Interfaith
Marriages (RIFM) and Presence of Religious Courts (PRC). Each indicator is binary,
respectively, 0 indicating no RIFM, no PRC, and 1 indicating respectively RIFM or PRC. The
combined variable ranges from 0 to 2, 0 indicating no religious legal pluralism in marriage, 1
indicating either religious legal pluralism (in terms of separate courts or restrictions on interfaith
marriage) and 2 indicating religious legal pluralism and restrictions on interfaith marriage.
While this is a primitive and simplistic measure of the complex notion of legal pluralism,
it does offer a first step into probing more quantification of pluralism. For the purpose of the
study, combining the two variables is theoretically sound, as the presence of religious courts is
14

For additional sources on religion and family law cross-national studies, see: Emory Law, Legal Profiles at:
http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/legal/, accessed November 2008; GlobaLex see: Marylin Johnson Raisch, ‘Religious
Legal Systems: A Brief Guide to Research and its Role in Comparative Law’, Hauser Global Law School Program,
New York University School of Law, February 2006, available at:
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Religious_Legal_Systems.htm, accessed December 2008; and the
University of Ottawa Law Library, Alphabetical Index of Legal Jurisdictions available at:
http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-legal-systems/eng-tableau.php, accessed November 2008. For the CIA
World Factbook, see Field Listing – Legal System, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2100.html, accessed December 2008. For the Library of Congress, see Guide to Law Online,
Nations of the World, available at: http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations.php, accessed December 2008.
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evidently an indication that some religious legal plurality exists, hence some degree of religious
legal autonomy exists over some jurisdictions. It is important as an added indicator that family
law is more profoundly governed by religion, as religious courts are most commonly given
jurisdiction over personal and family matters in many religiously pluralistic societies.
The addition of restrictions on interfaith marriages is especially relevant for the study as
it offers an added precision to the combined variable. It indicates the lack of civil marriage or the
lack of a choice to not convert to a spouse’s religion before marriage. This is especially pertinent
for women, as in most societies, both in the MENA and in other parts of Africa and Asia, this
leads to double standards where men are not expected to convert, while women are, and/or where
honor killings are accepted or excused. India is a prime example of this exclusive arrangement,
where in 2001 the already patriarchal state marriage legislation was amended through the Indian
Divorce Act to place greater restrictions on interfaith marriage, with 10 year imprisonment
penalties to religious leaders who contradict this law. 15 Women in rural and urban India
continue to suffer from both written law and traditional practices. Pakistan, Djibouti and Sudan
offer similar cases.
Within the MENA, extreme cases are most prevalent in Iran, where religious courts exist
and where interfaith marriage is banned, as well as in Saudi Arabia, where Islam is the only
religious and legal resort, and where interfaith marriage is criminalized. Indeed, prohibition on
interfaith marriage emphasizes inter-religious segregation and deems religion the only resort for
family and personal matters, where tribal customs often supersede, severely damaging the social,
political and economic well-being of women.

15

India: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2002), US Department of State. Available at:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18311.htm, last visited March 2009.
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CONTROL VARIABLES

State Official Religion: an ordinal variable (RAS dataset) ranging from 0 to 8 measuring
official state relationships with religions, with 0 indicating a country being hostile towards
religion, and 8 indicating that the state has one official religion enshrined in its constitution or
equivalent. 16
State Legal Discrimination against One or More Religions: an ordinal variable ranging
from 0 to 4 indicating the level of official state discrimination against one or more religions. This
is an important control variable as it refines the data to distinguish between countries like Iran,
Saudi Arabia and the UK, all of which have official religions, but the first two have “actual
preferences given to certain religions” and criminalize other religions. 17
British/French Colonialism: a binary variable coded from 0 to 1, assesses recent or postOttoman colonial history. A value of 0 indicates neither French nor British colonial history, and
a value of 1 indicates either French or British colonial rule. French and British colonial history
are the only two considered here, as they are the last two that spanned the MENA after the
Ottoman Empire dissipated. The institutions in place in the region today, especially legal and
political ones, are most strongly influenced by the British or French ones. Since the body of
social sciences literature covering 19th and 20th Century colonialism in the region is so extensive,
the inclusion of this variable in the model is essential.
Ottoman Rule: a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 542 years. This will measure the
duration of Ottoman Rule in each country. Scholars studying the MENA have identified Ottoman
colonial rule as a strong factor influencing both culture and the legal apparatus. Given that
remnants of the Ottoman millet system, designed and implemented by the Turkish authority in

16
17

See Appendix C for more detail and comparative country list.
Fox, p. 40.
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religiously pluralistic societies, in which the “millah” (Arabic term for religious sect) or “millal”
(religious sects) are protected by a pluralistic legal structure (Glenn), remain firmly in place in
most MENA and other countries, this factor ought not to be ignored.
Education - Gender Parity Index for Tertiary Education: an ordinal variable, ranging
from 0.15 to 3.42 measuring female to male parity in tertiary enrollment. The lower values
indicate a less favorable enrolment ratio for women and a more favorable ratio for men; the
higher the value, the more favorable the ratio for women to men. A Value of 1 indicates
complete gender parity in tertiary enrolment. The data is retrieved from the UNESCO Institute
for Statistics 2002 Gender Parity Index for Gross Enrollment Ratio – Tertiary. 18 Although
numerous data is available pertaining to gross enrollment ratios for all levels of education (preprimary, primary, secondary, and tertiary education), exclusively focusing on gender ratios for
enrollment in tertiary education seems most relevant for this study as this particular dataset
represents the level of education where women would presumably have reached a level of
maturity and independence as to be more aware of their rights, and hence be more capable of
addressing social, political, and economic issues more effectively. Evidence pertaining to this
assumption is to be discovered in the findings of the study.
GDP per Capita: a continuous variable retrieved from the International Monetary Fund,
The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2002. 19 As a fundamental variable when
discussing human rights and quality of life in any given country, GDP per capita is evidently
considered a basic valid control variable in the present statistical study. As per recent work on
the political and economic rights of women in the MENA, a squared measure of GDP will also
18

UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2002 Gender Parity Index for Gross Enrollment Ratio – Tertiary is available at
UNESCO Data Centre: http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/tableviewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143, accessed
March 2009.
19
IMF WEO Database April 2002 available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2002/01/data/, accessed
March 2009.
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be considered to address the possibility that as income increases the effect on WEPR may, but if
it rises above a certain level, it may have negative effects, as with oil rich countries of the Gulf
for instance, where too high an income may leave women comfortably out of the workforce, with
no incentive to participate in politics or the economy (Ross). Indeed, this theory may not
represent the majority in the MENA, as women across many parts of the region have
demonstrated economic strides (World Bank 2004) and development at given instances.
However, to take into consideration the possibility that an important elite minority may still
adhere to the social norm of not having an obligation/incentive to participate in the workforce
due to an established wealthy family at least allows for the testing of an existing theory in the
literature and avoids omitting what may be a significant variable.
Islamic Presence (As a Percentage of Total Population)20: a ten-level internal variable,
ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 indicating 0-10%; 2 indicating 11-20%; 3 indicating 21-30%; 4
indicating 31-40%; and 5 indicating 41-50%, and so on until 100%. Although this study is
examining state, religion and legal pluralism with regards to the rights of women without a
specific focus on any particular religion, the regional focus of the project begs a consideration of
the most prominent religion in the MENA—Islam. Indeed, Islam has been subject of lengthy
feminist discourse in the region. It is clear that this discourse is far from monolithic, ranging
from secularists to Islamic feminists, to ‘hybrid’ feminists. Secular feminists hold the view that
secularism, democracy and modernization are central potential solutions to misogyny in the
region (Moghadam; Moghissi; Shahidian; Jalal; Jilani); while Islamic feminists, ranging from
fundamentalists to moderates, advocate the Koran as a primary source of law, or as a source for
the re-interpretation of the religion as a means of improving the treatment of women in many
Islamic countries (Yamani; Tohidi, Najmabadi; Wadud, Webb 2000, Engineer, Ali, Mir20

Source: RAS dataset, which includes Islamic presence as percent of population by year.
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Hosseini, Mernissi; Karmi). Hybrid feminists see that democracy and modernization can
complement Islam to various degrees in different counties, in an effort to ameliorate the status of
Muslim women (Afshar; Povey; Ahmed). In any case, as a central variable to the issue of
women’s rights in the MENA, the exclusion of a measurement of Islamic prominence from the
study would be more absurd than its inclusion.
Non-Religious Adherents as Percent of Population: Retrieved from the Association of
Religion Data Archive 2005 list of “Most Non-Religious Nations”, this is an interval variable
ranging from 0 to 10, in the same order as variable measuring Islam. The purpose of including
this variable in the model is to take into consideration some measure of non-religiosity, since the
most encompassing cross-national religiosity data, by Norris and Inglehart (2004), is only
available for 70 of so countries. 21 Intuitively, one would expect the variable used in the present
study to have either a negative or a positive effect at different levels. In some cases, North Korea
and China come to mind as cases that may demonstrate negative effects on WPER, while states
like Norway and Switzerland may have positive ones. As with personal status law indicators, this
variable is only slightly sufficient as a proxy measure of religiosity, until future data is available.
Oil Production per Capita: This is a continuous variable measuring oil production in
billions of barrels per day per million people, retrieved from Nation Master, Oil production
statistics for year 2001. 22
Although oil as a variable may not be directly linked to legal systems, it certainly has
been linked to patriarchal and or authoritarian states by a number of scholars examining the
potential and existing tendency of oil rich states to correlate with the concentration of wealth in
the hands of an elite (Herb; Fisch; Giacomo; Haber and Menaldo); the typical employment of
21

See Fox, p. 36-39.
http://www.nationmaster.com/red/graph/ene_oil_pro_percap-energy-oil-production-percapita&date=2001&b_printable=1.
22

Data available at:
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more men than women in the oil industry; the decreased need for women in the workforce due to
the lucrative nature of the resource for each family (if a husband is employed in the oil industry,
presumably the need for a wife to work diminishes), and so on (Ross 2001, 2008). While no
particular view of the above mentioned is assumed prior to examining the findings in the present
study, due to its importance in the literature, and as a means of minimizing omitted variable bias,
oil is included as a control variable. As with income, oil has been shown to have different effects
at very high levels of production per capita, on democracy and on the economic participation of
women. Hence, oil-squared will also be considered in the model to take such possible issues into
consideration.
Regime Type: an ordinal variable, retrieved from Polity IV scores, consisting of a 21point scale ranging from values of -10, indicating a hereditary monarchy, to +10, indicating a
consolidated democracy. The body of literature addressing regime type is most notable in
political science, namely comparative politics, as a means of assessing and prescribing system
qualities in various countries. Social scientists frequently correlate liberal democracy with
political rights and civil liberties, social democracy with social and economic equality, and
authoritarianism with state repression. Scholars may also view less democratic systems as
forbearers of order and stability, traditional values and social cohesion, cultural and religious
conservation, referring, in some instances to a notion of human rights advocating less
individualistic and more community based values. Modern human rights discourse has become
charged with notions of democracy. Indeed, a recent statistical analysis by Steven C. Poe and
Neal C. Tate (1999) has shown that democracy has a statistically significant inverse relationship
with state repression of human rights to personal integrity. On either side of the debate, the type
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of regime governing those within its borders is indeed a fundamental factor in a cross-national
study of legal systems and political and economic rights.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is retrieved from the 2002 CIRI dataset. CIRI’s categorization of
the human rights of women is divided into three areas: 1) Women’s economic rights, 2)
Women’s political rights, and 3) Women’s social rights. This study will examine only the first
two, as the third right would create serious endogeneity issues given the independent variables
addressed in this model. Each category of the rights of women in the CIRI data is scaled from 0
to 3, with 0 indicating little or no protection for the rights of women in that domain, and 3
indicating that most or all of the rights of women are guaranteed. 23 The combined variable
“Women’s Political and Economic Rights” (WPER) is hence measured from 0 to 6.
The advantage of using this dataset is the fact that its takes into consideration de jure as
well as de facto assessments. For instance, a score of 0 for the economic rights of women
indicates that “there [are] no economic rights for women in law and that systematic
discrimination based on sex may have been built into law”—de jure assessment. A score of 1
indicates that “women [have] some economic rights under law, but these rights [are] not
effectively enforced”— de facto consideration. A score of 2 indicates that “women [have] some
economic rights under law, and the government effectively [enforces] these rights in practice
while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in economic matters”— de jure
and de facto considerations. A score of 3 indicates “that all or nearly all of women's economic
rights [are] guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in

23

For more on CIRI coding and measurement, see http://ciri.binghamton.edu/faq.asp#4. Also refer to Appendix A.
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practice”— de jure and de facto assessments. 24 Political (and Social rights) are assessed in the
same manner.
For the purpose of this study and to simplify the results, I have transformed these two
categories (political and economic rights) into one dependent variable, as opposed to two human
rights measures. Instead of a scaled measured from 0 to 3, the scores of all countries were
aggregated to form a scale of 0 to 6 (see figure 1 on page 2), which allows us to assess a
combined human rights variable for women, regressed against the various aforementioned
independent variables that this study will test.

Regression Model
The statistical method used in this study is the ordered logistic regression model, the most
efficient and appropriate statistical model to examine an ordinal dependent variable. The model
is executed eight times with the same regressand, Women’s PER, and with interchanging
independent variables. The first version of the model includes the uncombined indicators of
family law (personal status and inheritance), the uncombined indicators of religious legal
plurality (restrictions on interfaith marriages and presence of religious courts) to assess their
individual effect, while excluding Islam, Non-religious adherents and oil. The second model
includes those used in the first, while adding oil and oil-squared. The third model includes
personal status (excludes inheritance, as inheritance may have a less detrimental effect on
women than do marriage and divorce laws), and includes all other uncombined variables. The
fourth model includes the combined variables and all other variables, while excluding Islam and
non-religious adherents. The fifth model includes the combined variables and all other variables
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with the exception of income-squared. The sixth model teases out the significance of restrictions
on interfaith marriages and the presence of religious courts by including all variables except
RIFM. In the seventh model, which further assesses these two religious legal plurality variables,
the presence of religious courts is excluded, while all other variables are included. Finally, in the
eighth and last model, all variables are present, including the combined variable Family Law
(personal status and inheritance law) and the combined variable Religious Legal Pluralism
(presence of religious courts and restrictions on interfaith marriages).
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CHAPTER 5.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Family Law and Religious Legal Pluralism
When all variables are considered, a number of important finding arise. The first two
variables pertaining to the main hypotheses in this study are Religious Regulation of Family Law
(RFL) and Religious Legal Pluralism. First, we find that RFL does not yield significant results,
most logically due to the fact that, as explained in chapter four, the only variable available at the
time of writing for measuring “personal status” is highly vague, and does not specify which
component of personal status (marriage, divorce, or burial) is governed by the clergy and which
is not, leaving open the grounds for more specific inquiry in future research on personal status
law as a quantified variable in family law and human rights. Indeed, theoretical reasoning, as
well as case studies in the MENA, has shown family law to be a strong factor affecting the socioeconomic (and political) status of women, hence, more research and definition precision in future
data may very likely show significant results.
Second, we do find that Religious Legal Pluralism (RLP), whether in its combined or
separate component form, is highly significant in every single model. In fact, when combined
(Restrictions on Interfaith Marriages + Presence of Religious Courts), we find that religious legal
pluralism is consistently significant at P<.01, and is inversely correlated with WPER. The
presence of religious courts may well be a positive institutional construct in that it offers
minority rights in religious pluralities. However, when religious courts exist and they are the only
recourse to family law, whereby one must adhere to her/his court of birth religion and no other,
individual rights in general and women’s right in particular tend to suffer.
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Table 2. Regression Results I
Dependent Variable: Women’s Political and Economic Rights (CIRI 2002)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Personal Status
Inheritance
Family Law
(PS+ Inherit. C-Alpha: .92)
RIFM
Rel. Courts
Rel. Leg. Pluralism:
Crts+RIFM (C-Alpha: .79)
State Official Religion

1.374 (1.020)
-1.480 (.885)*
--

1.440 (1.024)
-1.121 ( .9120)
--

1.545 (.899)*
---

--.048 (.432)

-2.564 (1.021)**
-.594 (.714)
--

-2.527 (1.017)**
-.934 (.697)
--

-2.232(1.019)**
-.912 (.697)
--

-.068 (.103)

-.061 (.105)

-.085 ( .111)

State Disc. of Rel.

.098 (.214)

.098 ( .220)

.077 (.218)

Colonial

-.214 (.407)

-.111 (.416)

-.243 (.429)

Ottoman

.001 (.001)

.000 (.001)

.001 (.002)

Educ. Enrol. Ratio

.240 (.416)

.944 (.470)**

.841 (.493)

GDP

.0002 (.0001)**

.0002 (.0001)**

.0002 (.0001)**

GDP Squared
Islam
Non-Religious

-3.12e-09
(2.15e-09)
---

-2.99e-09
(2.43e-09)
---

-2.62e-09
(2.44e-09)
-.228 (.097)**
-.007 (.295)

---1.432
(.505)***
-.071
( .103)
.060
( .218)
-.081
(.413)
.000
(.001)
.902
(.464)*
.0002
(.0001)**
-3.00e-09
(2.45e-09)
---

Oil

--

Oil Squared

--

Polity IV

.113 (.039)***

-1.56e-06
(4.18e-06)
-3.40e-12
(3.98e-12)
.074 (.042)*

-2.10e-06
(4.11e-06)
-2.84e-12
(3.86e-12)
.045 ( .045)

-2.31e-06
(4.17e-06)
-2.91e-12
(4.09e-12)
.085 (.042)**

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Cut 5
Cut 6

-4.08 (.87)
-3.71 (.84)
-2.09 (.73)
1.41 (.70)
4.00 (.80)
6.90 (1.27)

-3.75 (.91)
-3.30 (.86)
-1.48(.75)
2.09 (.75)
4.85 (.87)
7.82 (1.32)

-4.82 (1.15)
-4.35 (1.10)
-2.47(.99)
1.26 (.94)
4.01 (1.04)
6.97 (1.43)

-3.71 (.88)
-3.27 (.84)
-1.53 (.73)
1.98 (.74)
4.75 (.86)
7.71 (1.32)

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
*P < .10
**P < .05
*** P < .01

136
.25

136
.28

136
.29

136
.27
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Table 3. Regression Results II
Dependent Variable: Women’s Political and Economic Rights (CIRI 2002)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Personal Status
Inheritance
Family Law
(Personal Status +
Inheritance.
C-Alpha: .92)
RIFM

--.606 (.490)

--.204 (.445)

--.387 (.468)

--.572 (.490)

--

--

-2.095 (.899)**

--

Rel. Courts
RLP: Courts +
InterFaith (C-Alpha: .79)
State Official Religion
State Disc. of a Rel.
Colonial
Ottoman
Edu. Enrol. Ratio

--1.291 (.502)**

-1.281 (.668)*
--

---

--1.320 (.502)***

-.096 (.108)
.070 (.218)
-.244 (.427)
.001 (.002)
.942 (.466)**

-.110 (.107)
.055 (.219)
-.178 (.429)
.0001 (.002)
.699 (.483)

-.083 (.109)
.046 (.218)
-.224 (.425)
.001 (.002)
.744 (.486)

-.086 (.109)
.063 (.219)
-.198 (.428)
.001 (.002)
.797 (.489)

GDP
GDP Squared

.0001 (.000)***
--

Islam
Non-Religious
Oil

Polity IV

-.232 (.097)**
-.005 (.294)
-1.65e-06
(3.93e-06)
-3.18e-12
(3.81e-12)
.060 (.044)

.0002 (.0001)**
-2.30e-09
( 2.45e-09)
-.229 (.098)**
.004 (.294)
-2.74e-06
( 4.15e-06)
-2.26e-12
(3.94e-12)
.067 (.044)

.0002 (.0001)**
-2.75e-09
( 2.40e-09)
-.221 (.098)**
.024 (.293)
-1.40e-06
(3.90e-06)
-3.01e-12
( 3.58e-12)
.0518 (.045)

.0002 (.0001)**
-2.64e-09
(2.44e-09)
-.226 (.098)**
-.005 (.295)
-2.38e-06
(4.19e-06)
-2.64e-12
(4.02e-12)
.055 (.045)

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Cut 5
Cut 6

-4.81 (1.13)
-4.34(1.09)
-2.52(.98)
1.18 (.92)
3.89 (1.02)
6.83 (1.42)

-4.82 (1.11)
-4.38 (1.07)
-2.65 (.97)
1.01 (.91)
3.74 (1.01)
6.68 (1.41)

-4.71 (1.13)
-4.26 (1.09)
-2.45 (.98)
1.24 (.93)
3.96 (1.03)
6.90 (1.43)

-4.76 (1.13)
-4.29 (1.09)
-2.48 (.98)
1.22 (.93)
3.98 (1.03)
6.93 (1.43)

Observations
Pseudo R-squared
*P < .10
**P < .05
*** P < .01

136
.28

136
.28

136
.28

136
.28

Oil Squared
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Table 4. Statistical Summary of all Variables
Variable
WPER
Family Law
Religious Legal Pluralism
State Religion
State Discrim. of Rel’s
Colonial Rule
Ottoman Rule
Education
GDP/cap
GDP/cap squared
Islam
Non Religious Adherents
Oil
Oil-Squared
Polity

Mean
3.220588
0.375
0.294118
5.110294
1.198529
0.426471
41.53676
1.041397
5963.743
1.22E+08
3.264706
1.308824
47839.49
3.25E+10
3.514706

Std. Dev.
1.106822
0.7496913
0.6454128
2.145358
0.9949491
0.4963922
120.7627
0.5265656
9326.923
2.92E+08
3.468878
0.6832895
174399.5
1.84E+11
6.642161

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.15
95.3
9082.09
1
1
0
0
-10

Max
6
2
2
8
4
1
542
3.42
39805
1.60E+09
10
5
1.30E+06
1.80E+12
10

Restrictions on interfaith marriages in addition to the presence of religious courts,
indicates a degree of plurality in the legal system that adds stringent exclusivity among religions
and particularly in the most important component of family law, which confirms strict recourse
to religion of birth. This means that personal choices in family law (particularly in marriage)
decrease substantially.
Indeed, RLP demonstrates the most prominent negative influence on Women’s human
rights. When the two components of RLP are assessed separately, RIFM is far more significant
than the presence of religious courts (although the latter does come out slightly significant at
P<.10 in model six). The consistent significance of RIFM at P<.05 does lead to a plausible
inference that when interfaith marriage is prohibited, individual human rights (of women and
men) may be infringed upon. Whether or not this is a direct causal relationship will require more
detailed analysis in future studies. However, we do find that a correlation is indeed present. One
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may certainly inquire on the indirect effect of RIFM as a proxy for other repressive factors in
society. Given the present study, we may begin to speculate or test the idea that as marriage is
governed by religious legislation, and marriage between two consenting adults of different
religious beliefs is banned, this creates institutionalized religious segregation. This may consist
of forced conversions for those who do wish to marry someone outside of their birth religion, in
which case, the converting party is obligated to follow legislation of which s/he is not convinced,
and laws that s/he would not otherwise follow. For instance, in Sudan, where interfaith marriage
is prohibited and religious courts are present, if a Muslim man wanted to marry a Christian
woman, the woman would have to convert to Islam and adhere to shari’a law, as she takes on her
husband’s religion (in most instances and in most countries, as discussed in chapter four, the
woman is expected or obliged to convert). If she refused to give up her religious beliefs, she
would then have to give up her partner/fiancé. If she refuses to give him up, then she must adhere
to laws of a religion that may not be to her preference. The issue here is not that conversion is
morally right or wrong. The serious problem is that, while in legal settings that offer secular,
non-secular, inter-religious and intra-religious options, a couple’s freedom of choice to convert
or to coexist is present and their right to chose their religious following in familial unions is
protected. A Christian and a Muslim can marry in Canada and have dual ceremonies (one in a
church and one in a mosque) and register their marriage in a civil court without any one of them
having to sacrifice their equal right to their belief, be that of any religious or non-religious
adherence. In the Philippines and in Malta, where religious courts exist to accommodate
religious minorities, interfaith marriage is not prohibited, and family law is not governed by the
clergy, which offers religious freedom to group minorities, and promotes religious tolerance,
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while protecting individuals by easing the limitations on one’s personal and family related
choices.
However, in most MENA countries (and other states in SSA and Asia) the options for
individuals to choose and to coexist are simply not there. How this affects women particularly is:
a) in the obligatory recourse to religious legislation, which is consistently less egalitarian than
secular legislation, and certainly more favorable to men (the list is generous here: nationality
through marriage laws, custody laws, adultery punishment for women compared to those of men,
honor killing laws, dowry laws, obedience laws, witness laws that deem a woman’s court
statement equivalent to half that of a man’s, etc, etc, etc.); b) in the coercion to choose between a
loved one and her faith, in which case, she often must lose one or the other; c) if the marriage she
does enter into by giving up her faith to her husband happens to fail, her rights are completely
subject to a religion that belongs to her husband and is not of her own conviction; and d) if she
wished to inquire on state court options for alternative non-religious legal codes, she finds none.
Indeed, women are not the only disadvantaged group in such instances, especially in
scenarios c) and d), however, women are most often more disadvantaged than men as the laws in
most religiously exclusive legal systems (namely in the MENA) tend to offer more control and
rights protection to men than to women in family laws. What we establish with this important
variable (RLP) is that the state-society interactions through the law (demonstrated in Figure 4),
are indeed worth examining. As a woman’s social sphere is governed by religious norms, which
are also enshrined in the legal apparatus, her access to power is limited to the avenues available
to her by these very social norms in the workforce and in politics. For instance, the fact that
Saudi women participate well in the workforce does not supersede the fact that they are
prohibited from driving a car. It also does not diminish the fact that they cannot run for office (or
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rule the monarchy), specifically because it is culturally (or by decree of religious authority)
unacceptable to do so. Conversely, while Iranian women run for and win seats in parliament,
they remain barred from political-religious positions reserved strictly for men. Furthermore, if a
woman’s husband wished his wife to leave the workplace and/or a political position, under
Iranian family law, she must obey. Religion permeates the law in the family, which permeates
the lives of women in the workplace, be that a factory, a coffee shop, a clinic, or even
parliament. The point is that when religion and only religion is the law, then women’s social,
economic and political lives become inevitably affected. Even in Lebanon, the so-called
“Switzerland of the Middle East”, where women have more opportunities than men do in the
workforce, where modernity is the constant social trend, the country is yet to usher in a female
political leader or Member of Parliament who is not the wife, the sister, the daughter or the
mother of a prominent political martyr. Without blood ties to a male political icon, a woman’s
political career remains gravely limited by social, cultural and religious norms.

Predictive Probability for WPER as a Function of RLP
If we were to predict the probability of a given country’s score on WPER as a function of
its level of Religious Legal Pluralism, we find some significant measures. RLP is a measure that
ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 indicating no presence of religious courts and no restrictions on
interfaith marriages; 1 indicating either PRC or RIFM; and 2 indicating both PRC and RIFM.
When Religious Legal Pluralism is at its median level of .29, a given country’s most likely
WPER score will be between 4 and 3, with 4 being more likely. When RLP is increased to a
level 1, the most likely scores will be between 3 and 4 with 3 more likely; and when RLP
increases to its maximum value 2, the most likely WPER scores will be between 2 and 3.
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Predictive Probability for WPER as a
Function of RLP
0.8
0.7
Probability

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

All Xs at Mean/Median
When RLP at 1
When RLP at 2

0

Figure 5. Predictive Probability for Women’s PER as a Function of Religious
Legal Pluralism—RLP ranges from 0 to 2, with a Mean of .29, and a SD
of .65; RLP Mode: 0 (frequency 137); 2 (frequency 19); 1 (frequency16);
WPER Mean 3.22 and SD of 1.11.

This means that as a country endorses greater levels of religious legal pluralism, lower levels of
women’s human rights are continuously more likely.

Islam and Income
The third and fourth findings concern Islam and income, which are constantly significant at
P<.05 or P<.01. We find that as the percentage of Muslim population increases in a given
country, the political and economic rights of women decrease. To understand the extent of the
effect, Figure 6 demonstrates the predictive probability for WPER as a function of Islam as a
percent of country population.
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Probability

Predictive Probability for WPER as a
function of Islam
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

All Xs at Mean/Median
When Islam at 5
When Islam at 7
When Islam at 10

Figure 6. Predictive Probability for Women’s PER as a Function of Percent
Muslim Population (Islam measured as interval variable from 0-10
indicating 0 to100 percent of country population). Islam variable Mean:
3.36, SD: 3.47.

When Islam is at its mean level of 3.36, which is equivalent to roughly 34 percent of
country population, the most likely WPER score to expect in a given country is between 3 and 4,
with 4 more likely than 3. When the Muslim population increases to 51-60 percent (interval level
5) the most likely WPER score drops to 3 at a probability of just over 0.6 (60% chance). As the
Muslim population increases to 71-80 percent the probability of a country scoring 3 on WPER
increase to 0.69 (69% chance), and the probabilities of scoring lower WPER all increase as the
green line is pushed further left on the x axis from its previous positions shown in red and blue.
As the Muslim population increases to 91-100 percent the likelihood of a country scoring 3 on
WPER increases to 0.7 (70% chance), and the probability of scoring 2 increases to over 0.1 (10%
chance). Theoretically, a number of possible explanations arise. First, Islam is not a monolithic
religion, as discussed in chapter 4, as definitional divisions on various topics within differing
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schools of thought in Islam do indeed exist and must be explored in future studies. The inverse
relationship between this particular religious presence and the human rights of women may be
less due to moral definitions of human rights by the faith itself and more due to the political
definitions of human rights in the various authoritarian regimes that happen to have high Muslim
populations. Whether Islam itself is compatible with human rights generally or women’s human
rights particularly is a discussion for other endeavors, as a more detailed analysis of the intrareligious divisions are necessary in order to accurately assess this complex variable.
Indeed, rigorous investigation of the tendency of Islamic majority countries to have such
a strong and exclusive relationship with the state is a field of study that may yield useful insight
into the discussion of human rights generally and women’s human rights particularly. As listed
in appendix C, and as mentioned in the Introduction, the Middle East and North Africa is a part
of the world that scores highest on all Government Involvement in Religion. Appendix C lists the
relationship (score and nominal description) between state and religion in 136 countries, and they
are listed in ascending order from highest WPER scores to lowest WPER scores. We find that
many of the lowest scores in WPER happen to be countries that are also most entangled with
religion, and most of these countries also happen to have a Muslim majority. More rigorous
investigation into state-religion entanglement and its correlation with human rights would likely
be enlightening on the discourse of human rights in traditional societies.
As for per capita income, we find a positive relationship with the human rights of
women. As demonstrated in Figure 7, as GDP per capita increases, so do WPER. When per
capita GDP is at its mean value of $5963.74, we would expect a given country to score between
and 3 and 4 on WPER (probability 0.45 and 0.47 respectively). As we increase income by one
standard deviation at $15290.66 per capita, the likelihood of scoring 4 on WPER in a given
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country increases to nearly 0.6. As we increase income to two standard deviations, at $24617.58
per capita, the likelihood of a country with that income to score 5 increases from nearly 0.06 at
mean GDP and 0.22 at 1 SD to 0.35. When income is increased to 4 standard deviations, at

Predictive Probability for WPER as a
Function of per Capita GDP
0.7
0.6
Axis Title

0.5
0.4

All Xs at Mean/Median

0.3

All Xs at GDP at 1SD

0.2

All Xs at GDP at 2 SDs

0.1

All Xs at GDP at 3 SDs

0

All Xs at GDP at 4 SDs

Figure 7. Predictive Probability for Women’s PER as a Function of per
Capita GDP. GDP Mean: 5963.74, SD: 9326.92.

$33944.50, the odds of a given country scoring 4 or 5 on WPER respectively increase to 0.5 and
0.4 (50% and 40% chances). This means that there is a 90% chance that countries will score
between 4 and 5 on WPER. In short, one can infer that economic development in a given country
is a strong emancipating factor for women’s political and economic status.

Colonialism, Ottoman Influence, Oil, Regime Type and Education
Historical French and British colonial rule seems to have no effect on the current status of
women, which may confirm the large body of literature that demonstrates a double-edge effect of
positive and negative influence on different portions of society in terms of economic and regime
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development. Indeed, this may be indicative of the fact that colonial rule did not have a
monolithic effect on women, hence resulting as insignificant when more important variable are at
stake.
Similarly, we find that Ottoman rule, which was instrumental in the introduction of the
millet system in many heterogeneous societies, such as those found in MENA region, is not
necessarily of any significance to either legal plurality or WPER. This is quite possibly due to
the fact that the presence of stronger attachment to religion and religious fractionalization in the
MENA may be higher than in other parts of the world. Further research into the relationship
between Ottoman rule, religious legal pluralism, and women’s human rights in the MENA would
be illuminating.
Oil, which has been strongly associated with patriarchy in the MENA, seems to lose
significance when legal plurality and state-religion intermingling increase. This is an especially
insightful finding as much recent literature has placed a great deal of onus primarily on oil, when
in reality, the picture is much more complex.
Surprisingly, regime type and education, which are often consistently significant in
human rights studies, lose some of their primacy when additional variables (namely those
concerning religion, the law and the state) are considered. Polity scores are only significant in
models 1 and 4 which exclude religious populations, Muslim and non-religious adherents,
indicating that religiosity or religious population percentages are more central than regime type
when assessing gender disparities in traditional societies such as those in the MENA. It may also
mean that more religious societies perhaps tend to be less democratic. Indeed, more democratic
societies are often more sensitive to human rights; however, we find here an added argument that
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human rights of some minorities over other (i.e. religious minorities over gender minorities) may
be favored. This is to be studied in further detail in the future.
As for education, it is only significant in Model 2, which excludes religious and nonreligious populations, also indicating that although education is an emancipating tool for
women’s economic and political development, increased religious presence or high religious
adherence levels may continue to overshadow the development of gender equality in these
domains. Again, more research on these variables is reserved for future endeavors.
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CONCLUSIONS
Religion, the law and the human rights of women are indeed interrelated, and a circular
relationship between these three concepts appears to be playing a role in maintaining a
comparatively lower status for women in MENA countries. Social aspects surrounding cultural
and religious norms affecting the domestic lives of women, in marriage, especially, are indeed
strongly influencing and/or influenced by the socio-political realms in a given country. The
causal relationship between social and religious norms, their institutionalization in state law, and
their effects on the domestic sphere, which then permeates the political and economic realms, is
a spiral of power allocation that must be examined more closely in order for the right policies to
be implemented in developing societies. In this study, we find that a strong inverse relationship
exists between the human rights of women and a) restrictions on interfaith marriage, b) the
presence of religious courts, and c) percent of a country’s Muslim population. We also find that
a positive relationship exists between a) per capita income, b) higher female gender ratio of
enrollment in tertiary level education (only when religion is excluded from consideration in the
model), and c) democracy (also only when religion is excluded from the model).
In short, we can claim that the human rights of women in terms of gender equality in the
MENA are indeed strongly correlated with the religious, legal and social aspects of that region.
More specifically, we find that an area which remains quite neglected in the political science
field, religious legal pluralism, presents much significance in its correlation with the human
rights of women. Whether this is a proxy variable acting as a clue that may lead to more
important findings in the future is yet to be determined by future analyses. In the meantime, this
probes our search for related clues through further precision of terms and more encompassing

47
data in order to explore the institutions, namely the frameworks of law, that govern the
implementation and protection of human rights in a given country.
The next steps will include, first, a religious legal plurality dataset, essential and yet to be
constructed, to assess institutional effects on the Human Rights of women and other minorities in
a given state. Second, refinement and precision in defining and measuring personal status law is
highly needed before current results may be accepted as true. Statistical analysis in the areas of
family and personal law (more appropriately defined) in conjunction with legal pluralism (also
more precisely measured in the future) may yield important and useful findings for future policy
makers and institution builders in democratizing societies especially for the emancipation of
women.
Third, while Non-Governmental organizations in the development, human rights and
legal fields have made commendable strides to emancipate and educate women from the
grassroots levels of society, complementary strides remain needed in terms of judicial
development in many developing societies. Although bottom-up approaches to social, economic
and political development are indispensable for the emancipation of women in developing
countries, without institutional flexibility, and without access to power, long-term changes
become increasingly difficult. Democratic development is indeed important in order for venues
of access to appear, yet when traditional judicial systems remain archaic and closed off to
women, access points decrease to the political and economic spheres and hope for a more truly
pluralistic institutional system that substantively addresses the individual human rights of
women, not only of religious and traditional communities, diminish substantially.
Fourth, institutional solutions do exist and they are not far from possible to implement. In
order to strike a balance between cultural rights and women’s human rights, which can
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sometimes conflict in traditional societies, the presence of religious courts is perfectly just in
providing religious plurality under two important conditions: 1) that options outside of religious
courts, in non-religious ones, are available and citizens have equal right of access to them
regardless of identity, and, as an added tolerance mechanism, 2) that inter-faith unions be
allowed to provide freedom from coerced conversion if one wishes to marry outside of her/his
religion of birth but remain interested in multiple spiritual ceremonies.
Granted, different governments and different societies may find one more feasible than
the other or may not find these solutions feasible at all, given their social and religious
fractionalization, religiosity and/or regime type. However, change is possible, as provided
enough actors are involved to promote it. These solutions will need commitment and cooperation
among international, supranational and transnational actors as well as domestic ones, all of
whom may pressure various governments to ameliorate their human rights performance by
building more tolerant legal systems with higher religious and cultural group freedoms as well as
individual liberties. By incorporating civil family codes in otherwise exclusively religious legal
systems, and by easing legal divisions among religious courts, the state would offer secular as
well as spiritual means, and a more flexible pluralistic system, to settle personal legal matters,
hence accommodating the religious majority or pluralities, while protecting the individual human
rights of women in marriage law through religious freedom and secular options.
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APPENDIX A: CIRI CRITERIA – THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN
Women’s Political Rights
Women's political rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights
include:
The right to vote
The right to run for political office
The right to hold elected and appointed government positions
The right to join political parties
The right to petition government officials
A score of 0 indicates that women's political rights were not guaranteed by law during a given
year. A score of 1 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in law, but severely
prohibited in practice. A score of 2 indicates that women's political rights were guaranteed in
law, but were still moderately prohibited in practice. Finally, a score of 3 indicates that women's
political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice.
Women’s Economic Rights
Women's economic rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights
include:
Equal pay for equal work
Free choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male
relative's consent
The right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative's
consent
Equality in hiring and promotion practices
Job security (maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs,
etc...)
Non-discrimination by employers
The right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace
The right to work at night
The right to work in occupations classified as dangerous
The right to work in the military and the police force
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A score of 0 indicates that there were no economic rights for women in law and that systematic
discrimination based on sex may have been built into law. A score of 1 indicates that women had
some economic rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced. A score of 2
indicates that women had some economic rights under law, and the government effectively
enforced these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women
in economic matters. Finally, a score of 3 indicates that all or nearly all of women's economic
rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in
practice.
Women’s Social Rights 25
Women's social rights include a number of internationally recognized rights. These rights
include:
The right to equal inheritance
The right to enter into marriage on a basis of equality with men
The right to travel abroad
The right to obtain a passport
The right to confer citizenship to children or a husband
The right to initiate a divorce
The right to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage
The right to participate in social, cultural, and community activities
The right to an education
The freedom to choose a residence/domicile
Freedom from female genital mutilation of children and of adults without their consent
Freedom from forced sterilization
A score of 0 indicates that there were no social rights for women in law and that systematic
discrimination based on sex may have been built into law. A score of 1 indicates that women had
some social rights under law, but these rights were not effectively enforced. A score of 2
indicates that women had some social rights under law, and the government effectively enforced
these rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in
25

The social rights of women are not included as a variable in the present study as its parameters would cause
endogeneity problems, given the fact that the independent variables tested in the statistical regression are measuring
social aspects which are also included in the social rights parameter measured by CIRI. Hence the Political and
Economic Rights of women from the CIRI data are the ones chosen for this study so as to minimize bias in the final
results.
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economic matters. Finally, a score of 3 indicates that all or nearly all of women's social rights
were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforced these laws in practice.
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APPENDIX B: REGIONAL DIVISIONS PERTAINING TO FIGURE 1
(WPER BY REGION CIRI 2002)
MENA

SSA

L.AM

OCEA

Algeria
Libya

Angola
Benin

Argentina
Belize

Morocco

Botswana

Tunisia

Burkina Faso

ASIA

EUR

N.AM

Australia Armenia
Fiji
Azerbaijan

Albania
Austria

Canada
United
States of
America

Bolivia

New
Zealand

Bangladesh

Belarus

Brazil

Papua
New
Guinea

Bhutan

Belgium

Afghanistan Burundi

Chile

Brunei

Bahrain
Egypt

Colombia
Costa Rica

Burma
Cambodia

Bosnia
Herzegovenia
Bulgaria
Croatia

China
Cyprus

Czech Rep.
Denmark

Georgia
India
Indonesia
Japan
Kazakhstan
Korea, North

Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary

Iran
Iraq

Cameroon
Central
African Rep
Chad
Congo, DR of

Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Oman
Pakistan

Congo, R of
Cote d'Ivoire
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia

Cuba
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras

Saudi
Arabia
Syria
Turkey

Ghana

Jamaica

Korea, South

Iceland

Guinea
GuineaBissau
Kenya
Lesotho

Mexico
Nicaragua

Kyrgyztan
Laos

Ireland
Italy

Panama
Paraguay

Malaysia
Mongolia

Latvia
Lithuania

Peru
Trinidad
and
Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela

Nepal
Philippines

Luxembourg
Macedonia

Singapore
Sri Lanka
Taiwan

Moldova
Netherlands
Norway

Qatar
United
Arab
Emirates
Yemen

Liberia
Madagascar

Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
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Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovak Rep.
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
United
Kingdom
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APPENDIX C: WOMEN’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS (CIRI 2002) MOST TO
LEAST FREE AND STATE RELATIONSHIP WITH RELIGION
Country

WEPR

State Religion

Sweden
Austria
Canada
Costa Rica
Cuba

6
5
5
5
5

Denmark
Finland

5
5

France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Namibia
New Zealand
Norway
South Africa
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Belize
Bosnia
Herzegovina
Croatia
Cyprus

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4

Czech Rep
Estonia
Fiji
Ghana
Greece
Guinea
Guyana
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast

Score

Illegal Religions

Score

Cooperation
Cooperation
Accommodation
One State Religion
Inadvertent
Insensitivity
One State Religion
State multiple
established Rel's
Separationist
Cooperation
Cooperation
One State Religion
Accommodation
Cooperation
One State Religion
Accommodation
One State Religion
Accommodation
Cooperation
Civil Religion
Cooperation

5
5
3
8
1

No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations

0
2
0
1
2

8
7

No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations

1
2

2
5
5
8
3
5
8
3
8
3
5
6
5

Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations

2
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
1
1

4 Civil Religion
4 Inadvertent
Insensitivity
4 Cooperation
4 Accommodation
4 Civil Religion
4 Accommodation
4 One State Religion
4 Civil Religion
4 Accommodation
4 Civil Religion
4 One State Religion
4 Cooperation
4 Cooperation

6
1

No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations

1
1

5
3
6
3
8
3
3
6
8
5
5

No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations

1
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
0
1
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Jamaica
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malaysia
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Mozambique
Netherlands
Panama
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Singapore
Slovenia
Spain
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Trinidad &
Tobago
Turkey
UK
United States
Venezuela
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil

4 Cooperation
4 Separationist
4 Inadvertent
Insensitivity
4 Cooperation
4 Cooperation
4 Cooperation
4 Cooperation
4 One State Religion
4 Separationist
4 Civil Religion
4 Accommodation
4 Accommodation
4 Accommodation
4 Civil Religion
4 Civil Religion
4 Civil Religion
4 Civil Religion
4 Separationist
4 Cooperation
4 Civil Religion
4 Cooperation
4 Accommodation
4 Cooperation
4 Accommodation
4 Civil Religion
4 State multiple
established Rel's
4 Accommodation
4 Civil Religion
3 Accommodation
3 One State Religion
3 Accommodation
3 One State Religion
3 Separationist
3 One State Religion
3 Civil Religion
3 Accommodation
3 One State Religion
3 One State Religion
3 Accommodation
3 Accommodation

5
2
1

No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations

1
1
2

5
5
5
5
8
2
6
3
3
3
6
6
6
6
2
5
6
5
3
5
3

No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Some Rel's illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
Some Rel's illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal

1
1
0
1
3
0
2
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
3
0
2
1
0
1
0

6
7

Some Rel's illegal
No illeg, some limitations

3
1

3
6
3
8
3
8
2
8
6
3
8
8
3
3

No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal

0
1
1
2
0
2
2
1
2
0
2
1
1
0
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Bulgaria
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cent. African
Rep.
Chad
Chile
China
Columbia
Congo
Brazzaville
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Guatemala
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Liberia
Macedonia
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Morocco
Nepal
Nicaragua
North Korea
Oman
Paraguay

3
3
3
3
3

Civil Religion
Accommodation
One State Religion
Accommodation
Accommodation

6
3
8
3
3

Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Some Rel's illegal
Some Rel's illegal

2
0
1
3
3

3 Cooperation
3 Civil Religion
3 Inadvertent
Insensitivity
3 Civil Religion
3 Accommodation

5
6
1

Some Rel's illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Some Rel's illegal

3
1
3

6
3

No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal

1
0

3 One State Religion

3

No illeg, some limitations

0

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

3
8
6
2
5
3
3
6
6
6
6
6
5
6
3
5
5
3
6
3
3
8
8
6
6
1

No Minority Rel Illegal
Some Rel's illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
Some Rel's illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
Legal limitations
Legal limitations
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
Some Rel's illegal

0
3
1
2
1
2
0
2
0
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
2
0
2
0
2
2
2
2
1
3

8
6

Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations

2
1

Accommodation
One State Religion
Civil Religion
Separationist
Cooperation
Accommodation
Accommodation
Civil Religion
Civil Religion
Accommodation
Civil Religion
Civil Religion
Cooperation
Civil Religion
Accommodation
Cooperation
Cooperation
Accommodation
Civil Religion
Accommodation
Accommodation
One State Religion
One State Religion
Civil Religion
Civil Religion
Inadvertent
Insensitivity
3 One State Religion
3 Civil Religion

62
Philippines
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Slovakia
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Syria
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Bahrain
Brunei
Burkina Faso
Burma
DRC
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Lesotho
Libya
Mauritius
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New
Guinea
Sudan
Tajikistan
UAE
Iran
Kuwait

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Supportive
Civil Religion
Civil Religion
Accommodation
Accommodation
Cooperation
Cooperation
Accommodation
One State Religion
Accommodation
Civil Religion
Cooperation
Cooperation
One State Religion
Civil Religion
Accommodation
Cooperation
Separationist
Civil Religion
Hostile
One State Religion
Accommodation
One State Religion
One State Religion
Accommodation
Civil Religion
Accommodation
One State Religion
One State Religion
Cooperation
Accommodation
One State Religion
Cooperation
Separationist
Cooperation
One State Religion
Civil Religion

4
6
6
3
3
5
5
3
8
3
6
5
5
8
6
3
5
2
6
0
8
3
8
8
3
6
8
8
8
5
3
8
5
2
5
8
6

No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Some Rel's illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
Legal limitations
Some Rel's illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
Some Rel's illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Some Rel's illegal
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
Some Rel's illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations
Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal

0
1
2
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
3
0
1
2
2
3
1
0
2
3
1
3
1
2
0
2
0
2
3
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0

2
2
2
1
1

One State Religion
Separationist
One State Religion
One State Religion
One State Religion

8
2
8
8
8

Legal limitations
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
Some Rel's illegal
Legal limitations

2
0
2
3
2
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Yemen
Somalia
Afghanistan
Andorra
Bahamas
Barbados
Cape Verde
Comoros
Djibouti
Equatorial
Guinea
Liechtenstein
Maldives
Malta
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Solomon Islands
Suriname
Vanuatu

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

One State Religion
One State Religion
One State Religion
One State Religion
Accommodation
Accommodation
Civil Religion
One State Religion
One State Religion
Civil Religion

8
8
8
8
3
3
6
8
8
6

Legal limitations
Legal limitations
Some Rel's illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
No illeg, some limitations
No illeg, some limitations

2
2
3
0
0
0
0
2
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

One State Religion
One State Religion
One State Religion
One State Religion
One State Religion
Supportive
Supportive
Cooperation

8
8
8
8
8
4
4
5

No illeg, some limitations
All Min Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
Legal limitations
All Min Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No Minority Rel Illegal
No illeg, some limitations

1
4
0
2
4
0
0
1
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APPENDIX D: LEGAL RELIGIOUS RESTRICTIONS (RAS DATA)
Country

MENA
Afghanistan
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan*
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
UAE
Yemen
OCEA
Australia
Fiji
New Zealand
P. New Guinea
Solomon
Islands
Vanuatu
SSA
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde

Personal Inheritance Percent of
Status Defined Defined by Population
Religion Islam
by Clergy

Restrictions
on Interfaith
Marriages

Presence of
Religious
Courts

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

90
98
99
98
94
99
97
15
92
85
56
98
99
87
96
95
97
90
98
100
96
99
2
1
8
0
0
0
0
33
0
12
0
50
10
20
1
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Cent. African
Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Brazzaville
Djibouti
DR Congo
Equatorial
Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
ASIA

15
51
98
2
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

94
10
1

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

49
45
1
87
18
42
77
39
10
0
18
5
20
82
99
17
19
0
84
50
8
91
55
99
2
70
10
32
19
14
3
1
30
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Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Brunei
Burma
Cambodia
China
Cyprus
Georgia
India
Indonesia
Japan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Malaysia
Maldives
Mongolia
Nepal
North Korea
Philippines
Singapore*
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Thailand
Turkmenistan
LAC
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Columbia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

0
95
86
1
64
4
6
2
18
11
12
73
0
47
75
0
55
99
5
4
0
5
15
0
9
0
85
10
89
2
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Trinidad &
Tobago
EUR
Albania
Andorra
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia*
Czech Rep
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Netherlands

0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
20
7
6
65
4
2
0
3
44

Yes

13
2
0
2
0
0
7
4
0
0
0
0
2
0
5
0
2
28
0
7
4

68
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden*
Switzerland
UK
Ukraine
N.AM
Canada
United States

1
0
0
1
8
0
1
3
3
2
2
4
1
1
2

